I don't work on Fedora security directly, but I do maintain some crypto components. As such, I have my own opinions about how things ought to work, which I will refrain from here. My intent is to demonstrate the problem so that the project can discuss solutions.

To keep this easy to follow, my data and process is in a section at the end; curious readers should be able to double-check me.


At the time of writing, there are 2,336 open CVE bugs against Fedora. While it's not realistic for that number to be 0, this is clearly way too many.

Additionally, a majority of them (2309) are older than 4 weeks. I understand from experience that even the most important bugs are rarely fixed instantaneously, but having bugs that old (and so many) speaks to deeper problems with the way maintenance is done right now. In fact, here's the year breakdown:

2010: 4
2011: 11
2012: 17
2013: 18
2014: 30
2015: 74
2016: 195
2017: 425
2018: 682
2019: 852
2020: 27

So a concentration in the past couple years, but with a very long tail.

My query includes both "regular" Fedora and EPEL. There are 1266 EPEL bugs in this set (which leaves 1070 non-EPEL). So the problem is worse for EPEL, but EPEL is by no means responsible for this huge number.

It's possible to slice this by component, but I don't actually want to do that here because my intent is not to point fingers at specific people. However, there are a few ecosystems that seem to be having particular trouble (based on visual inspection of names):

mingw: 459
python: 81
nodejs: 72
ruby: 32
php: 23

(The remainder don't clearly group.)

That's all the analysis I could think of to run, but see the methodology section below if you want to build on what's here.

Fedora policies

A majority of CVE bugs are created by Red Hat's Product Security (of which team I am not a member; I'm in Security Engineering). They provide this service on a best-effort basis. As I understand it, the theory is that maintainers should be aware enough of their packages to know whether a release fixes a security bug or not. (And also that an extra bug for us to close once in a while isn't the end of the world.)

Fedora has some policy around security bugs in the Package maintainer responsibilities document, but it's very weak (to someone coming from RFC 2119-land, at any rate). It says:

Package maintainer should handle security issues quickly, and if they need help they should contact the Security Response Team.

("Security Response Team" is a broken link, which I've reported here.)

This effectively treats security bugs no differently than other bugs. The only recourse for maintainers not fixing bugs in general is the nonresponsive maintainer process, which won't help if the maintainer is still active in the process but hostile toward fixing/triaging their bugs.

So it has to go to FESCo. FESCo presumably does not want to handle the hundreds of tickets for all of these, which means that the status quo is inadequate.

In short: no one is minding the store, and more worryingly, there is no way for anyone to start minding the store.

What I've done

I've reached out to some maintainers, including folks from mingw. I currently have a FESCo ticket (#2333) for getting those resolved.

Reaching out to EPEL maintainers has proven unsuccessful on the whole. From my scattered sampling, these bugs aren't getting fixed because the default package assignee is not interested in maintaining EPEL. (Presumably someone else did in the past, and they have vanished.)

I've also written this post, which I hope will spark a concerted effort to fix the problem.


All information in this post is readily accessible to any Fedora contributor, no special access required.

I used this bugzilla query. I downloaded the data as CSV, then queried and filtered it using python. I'm sure there are better ways to do this, but I'm not a statistician. I also mostly write C.

Once I had downloaded the CSV, I imported it like so:

import csv

with open("bugs-2020-01-28.csv", "r") as f:
    db = list(db.DictReader(f))

The csv module's interface is obnoxious. It wants to give back an iterator over the file, so we have to drain the iterator before the file can be closed. (Otherwise it becomes unhappy.) This leaves us with an object of type roughly List<OrderedDict<String, String>>. Really what I'd like is Set<Dict<String, String>>, but neither Dict nor OrderedDict are hashable, so Python doesn't allow that.

For determining age, I'm abusing the fact that it's January 2020 right now:

old = [bug for bug in db if "CVE-2020" not in bug["Summary"]]

Mapping years:

import re

from collections import defaultdict

years = defaultdict(int)
r = re.compile(r"CVE-(\d{4})-")
for bug in db:
    match = r.search(bug["Summary"])
    if match is None:

    year = match.group(1)
    years[year] += 1

for key in sorted(years.keys()):
    print(f"{key}: {years[key]}


epel = [bug for bug in db if bug["Product"] == "Fedora EPEL"]


components = defaultdict(int)
for bug in db:
    components[bug["Component"]] += 1

for c in sorted(components.keys()):
    print(f"{c}: {components[c]}")

def ecosystem(e):
    count = 0
    for c in components:
        if c.startswith(f"{e}-"):
            count += components[c]

    return count